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DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND U.S. - MEXICO BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS
HOPE H. CAMP, JR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The increase of trade between the United States and Mexico will
naturally lead to a greater number of private commercial disputes.' Re-
solving these disputes in the courts of either Mexico or the United States
is generally not satisfactory to the parties involved as the differences
between the two legal systems create uncertainty and suspicion. Concil-
iation, mediation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution can
alleviate much of the stress involved in U.S. - Mexico business transactions
if a problem should arise. In my experience, binding arbitration provides
the best opportunity for a fair process, an efficient ruling, and a just
outcome.
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS UNDER NAFTA
The dispute resolution mechanism is an integral part of the North
American Free Trade Agreement2 (NAFTA). There are three discrete
dispute resolution mechanisms set forth in Chapters 20, 19 and 11. Chapter
20 provides the general dispute settlement mechanism for resolving disputes
among Canada, the United States, and Mexico.' Chapter 19 provides the
method for settlement of disputes arising under the antidumping and
countervailing duties laws. 4 Chapter 11, on the other hand, permits
individual investors to demand arbitration against a member country if
its investment is prejudiced because a member country violated the un-
dertakings pursuant to NAFTA.5 It is important to note that Chapter
20 does not apply to investment disputes between a member country and
an investor. However, Subchapter B of Chapter 11 does provide me-
chanisms for arbitration between the host government and the investor
when th&"latter believes that the former has breached its obligations under
* Shareholder, Jenkens & Gilchrist, PA, San Antonio, Texas. B.A. David Lipscomb College,
LL.B. Tulane University of Louisiana. Member of the State Bars of Texas, California, and Louisiana.
Member of the American and Inter-American Bar Association, Licensing Executives Society, Institute
of Tranmsational Arbitration Advisory Board, Southwestern Legal Foundation, and American Ar-
bitration Association.
1. Jeffery P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA: The Newer
and Improved Model, 27 INT'L L. 603 (1993).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (effective Jan. 1,
1994), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
3. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 20, art. 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 694.
4. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 19, art. 1904, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
5. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1101, 32 I.L.M. at 639.
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the Agreement. 6 Consultative steps are required in order to ripen this
Chapter 11 right to arbitration. None of these arbitration procedures
establish a new procedural regime, rather, NAFTA allows investors to
seek arbitration for violations of the Agreement under the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules (UNCITLAR)
or the Convention on the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).Y
Articles 1116 and 1117 set out the requirements to bring a claim against
the host country both for an investor on behalf of itself as well as an
investor on behalf of an enterprise.8 First, another member country must
breach either a provision found in Subchapter A of Chapter 11, Article
1502(3)(a) regarding monopolies and state enterprises, or Article 1503(2)
concerning state enterprises where the alleged breach pertains to the
obligations of Subchapter A. Second, the investor must incur a loss or
damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach. Third, a limitation
of three years exists between the date the investor acquired, or should
have acquired, knowledge of the breach, and knowledge that the investor
incurred a loss or damage. Fourth, when two or more claims are submitted
to arbitration that arise out of the same events which gave rise to the
claim, the claims should be heard together unless the interests of a
disputing party are prejudiced.
Article 1118 requires the disputing investor send a notice of intent to
submit an arbitration claim to the member country at least 90 days before
the claim is submitted.9 The notice shall specify the name and address
of the disputing investor, the provisions of NAFTA which are alleged
to have been breached, the issues and factual basis for the claim, the
relief sought, and the approximate amount of damages claimed. The
disputing parties should first, however, attempt to settle the claim through
consultation or negotiation. 10 Moreover, subject to Annex 1120.1, investors
may submit claims to be arbitrated under ICSID provided six months
has elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim and both disputants
are parties to ICSID." Furthermore, the investor may also submit claims
under the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID provided that either the
investor's country or the host country is a party to ICSID. In addition,
arbitration claims may also be submitted under the UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration Rules. 12
In order for either an investor under Article 1116 or an enterprise
under Article 1117 to submit a claim to arbitration, certain conditions
precedent must be met under Article 1121.13 First, the investor must
6. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
7. NAFTA, su--a note 2, ch. 20, art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
8. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, arts. 1116-17, 32 I.L.M. at 642-43.
9. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1118, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
10. Id.
11. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1120(1), 32 I.L.M. at 644.
12. Id.
13. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1121, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
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consent to arbitration. Second, both the investor and the enterprise must
waive the right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal
or court under the domestic law of any member country. This includes
proceedings relating to the alleged breach of NAFTA with the exception
of injunctive, declaratory, or other extraordinary relief proceedings not
involving the payment of monetary damages. Finally, the consent and
waiver must be in writing, must be given to the host country, and must
be included in the submission of a claim for arbitration.
The composition of the arbitration tribunal is addressed in Articles
1123 and 1124.14 Except as provided by consolidation Article 1125, and
unless the disputing parties agree otherwise, the tribunal consists of 3
arbitrators. One arbitrator is submitted by each of the disputing parties
and the presiding arbitrator shall be appointed by agreement of the
disputing parties. However, when an arbitration panel is not constituted
within 90 days from the date a claim is submitted for arbitration, the
secretary-general of ICSID, at the request of either party, will appoint
the required arbitrator(s). Similarly, when the disputing parties are unable
to agree on the appointment of the presiding arbitrator, the secretary-
general of ICSID, at the request of either party, will appoint an arbitrator
so long as the arbitrator is not a national of either of the disputing
parties. These arbitrators are selected from a roster of 45 persons ap-
pointed by a consensus of the NAFTA member countries, or when no
roster is available, from the ICSID panel of arbitrators. 5
Article 1125 provides that when claims submitted to arbitration have
a question of law or fact in common, a party can petition for consolidation
of claims. 11 The tribunal may, in the interest of fair and efficient resolution
of the claims, consolidate all or part of the claims. Sixty days after a
request for consolidation is submitted by a disputing party, the secretary-
general of ICSID must establish a tribunal of three arbitrators from the
roster list, as provided in Article 1124, or from the ICSID Panel of
Arbitrators, so long as an arbitrator is not a national of any of the
parties to the dispute. In addition, there are various duties of the parties
to a dispute which are laid out in Subchapter B. '7 For example, Article
1126 provides that a disputing party shall deliver to the other parties
written notice of a claim that has been submitted to arbitration within
30 days from the date that the claim is submitted. The disputing party
shall deliver to the other parties copies of all pleadings filed in the
arbitration. Moreover, on written notice to the disputing parties, a party
may make submissions to a tribunal on a question of interpretation of
NAFTA. 18 A party shall, at their own expense, be entitled to receive
from the disputing party a copy of evidence and a copy of the written
argument of the disputing parties.
14. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, arts. 1123-24, 32 I.L.M. at 644.
15. Id.
16. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1125, 32 I.L.M. at 645.
17. NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1126, 32 I.L.M. at 644-45.
18. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1127, 32 I.L.M. at 645.
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Articles 1129 and 1130 of NAFTA address the location of the tribunal
and the governing law. 19 Unless decided otherwise by the disputing parties,
the tribunal will be in the territory of a NAFTA country that is a party
to the New York Convention. A tribunal established under NAFTA shall
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with NAFTA and applicable
rules of international law. In addition, a tribunal may take interim
measures to preserve the respective rights of the disputing parties, or to
ensure that the tribunal's jurisdiction is made fully effective. Such meas-
ures include orders to preserve evidence in the possession or control of
a disputing party, or to protect the tribunal's jurisdiction. Measures not
included are orders of attachment or an order to enjoin the application
of the measure alleged to be the breach of Subchapter A of Chapter
11, Article 1502(3)(a), or Article 1503(2).
Article 1117 speaks to the form an arbitral award make take. 20 For
instance, a tribunal's final award may only include restitution of property
or monetary damages with applicable interest. Any awards of restitution
or monetary damages shall be paid to the enterprise if the claim is made
under Article 1117. It is important to note that an arbitration tribunal,
as provided for in the NAFTA, may not award punitive damages. 2 1
Article 1135 discusses the finality and the enforcement of an award.22
It states an award made by a tribunal is binding on the disputing parties
but shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and
in respect to the particular case. In practice, however, a tribunal will
take into account prior decisions of other tribunals.23 An investor must
seek enforcement of an award within 120 days from the date of judgment
in the case of an ICSID award. In the case of the Additional Facility
Rules of ICSID or a UNCITRAL award, an investor has 3 months to
seek enforcement of an award from the date of judgment. If a host
country fails to comply with the terms of a final award, the NAFTA
Commission shall, as per Chapter 20 and upon the request of the home
country of the investor, establish a panel in which the investor's country
may seek both a determination that the failure to abide by and comply
with the terms of the final award is inconsistent with the obligations of
NAFTA, and a recommendation that the defaulting party abide by or
comply with the terms of the final award.24 Because Chapter 11 does
not address challenges to investor panel decisions, the rules of the ap-
propriate arbitral regime control. 25 Thus, a disputing investor may seek
19. NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 11, arts. 1129-30, 32 I.L.M. at 645.
20. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch 11., art. 1117, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
21. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1135, 32 I.L.M. at 646.
22. Id.
23. Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter.- Substantive Rules and
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 735 (1993).
24. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1135(6), 32 I.L.M. at 646.
25. F. Amanda Debusk & Gary N. Horlick, NAFTA Dispute Resolution, INT'L TRADE COMM.
NEWSL., Winter 1993-94, at 2.
|VoI. 5
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
enforcement of an arbitral award regardless of whether a panel has been
established as per Article 1135(6).16
Exclusions to NAFTA are addressed in Article 1137.27 For example,
a NAFTA host country may prohibit or restrict the acquisition of an
investment in its territory by an investor from a different NAFTA country
on the grounds of national security. In such a case, the host country
may refuse to participate in the investor-state dispute resolution under
Chapter I 1 or Chapter 20, and the refusal may not be challenged by
the NAFTA Commission. In addition, the dispute settlement measures
found in Chapters 11 and 20 are not applicable to decisions made by
Canada or Mexico whether to permit an acquisition that is subject to
an investment review.28
III. ADVANTAGES OF BINDING ARBITRATION OVER OTHER
FORMS OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Even if NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions are not applicable to individual
investors, there are significant advantages of binding arbitration over
judicial and other non-judicial forms of commercial dispute resolution.
Such advantages arise because the civil justice systems of Mexico and
the United States are substantively different. As a result of these dif-
ferences, confusion arises in the minds of foreign businesspersons. For
example, the "C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal" [Federal District
Civil Code], limits damages that may be recovered in a civil action,
whereas U.S. law creates opportunities for unlimited damages, including
punitive damages.2 9 In Mexico, an injunction is not available as a remedy
in commercial disputes where damages are irreparable or cannot be
measured in monetary terms. In the United States, an injunction is often
the preferred remedy for resolving a commercial dispute. The jury is not
a part of adjudication of civil disputes in Mexico, whereas it is an integral
part of the system in the United States. In Mexico, trial evidence is
mainly presented by documentation in front of judges who question the
witnesses, and pre-trial discovery is not allowed on the same scale as in
the United States. These differences and others reinforce a party's doubts
that the legal system of his or her counterpart will lead to a definitive
resolution of a commercial dispute that will be fair.
26. See NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. II, art. 1135(6), 32 I.L.M. at 646. When a Party fails to
abide by or comply with the terms of a final award, the Commission shall, by request of the
investor's country, establish a panel. In such proceedings, the requesting Party may seek (a) a
determination that a failure to comply with the award is inconsistent with the obligations set forth
under NAFTA, and (b) a recommendation that the defaulting Party comply with the terms of the
final award.
27. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1137, 32 I.L.M. at 646-47.
28. Id.
29. See Hernandez v. Burger, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564, 566 (1980) (in automobile accident, court
applied "governmental interest analysis" to select Mexico's "law of limited damages" instead of
California's "unlimited damages rule"); see generally Friedler, Moral Damages in Mexican Law: A
Comparative Approach, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 235 (1986).
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With these differences in mind, the following five sections will outline
reasons why arbitration is a preferred choice for resolution of commercial
disputes between Mexican and U.S. businesspeople. By way of intro-
duction, submission of disputes to the court systems of either country
raises the following concerns:
" Unpredictability as to the enforcement of any judgment rendered;
* Fear of not being treated impartially in the other party's country;
" Distress that the details of the dispute will be aired in public;
* Worry that the lack of technical expertise in a jury will lead to
an improper result; and,
* The well-founded belief that court proceedings are expensive and
time consuming.
A. Enforceability
Enforceability as an element of predictability cannot be underestimated.
The business community dislikes uncertainty above almost all other risks
of doing business. Fortunately, the New York and Panama Conventions
lessen uncertainty that an agreement to arbitrate will be enforced and
adds assurance that support will be provided by the courts of either
Mexico or the United States for the enforcement of an arbitration award.3 0
Decisions of arbitrators, pursuant to the New York or Panamanian
connections, may be appealed but only under very limited circumstances.3 1
In contrast, the businessperson relying on litigation can only hope that
foreign judges will liberally apply notions of comity and be well educated
in applying internationally acceptable standards when considering:
" Whether the choice of law made by the parties is acceptable to
the court where a judgment is sought to be enforced;
" Whether the conflicts of law rules suggested by the parties or by
the court rendering the judgment were either applicable or correctly
interpreted and applied;
" Whether, in the court's view, the award violates some basic public
policy consideration;
" Whether the court which heard the case based its findings upon
sufficient evidence or evidence that was properly obtained; and,
" Whether judgments will be enforceable as there exists no treaty
between the United States and Mexico with respect to the en-
forcement of judgments.
Mexican appellate courts have shown a willingness to enforce foreign
arbitration awards. In Presoffice S.A. vs. Centro Editorial Hoy, S.A.,12
a French publishing company obtained an arbitral award against a Mexican
publishing concern through the International Chamber of Commerce Court
of Arbitration in Paris, France. The Fifth Chamber of the Higher Court
30. See NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1136, 32 I.L.M. at 646.
31. Id.
32. Judgment rendered by the Eighteenth Civil Court of Mexico City, DOING Bus. IN MEXICO,
Feb. 24, 1977, § 18.06-18.07.
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of Appeals of the Federal District in Paris affirmed the decision of the
lower court by unanimous decision." In a similar case, Maiden Mills,
Inc. vs. Hilaturas Lourdes, S.A. , 4 the Mexican court upheld the en-
forcement of an award rendered by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) of New York in favor of a party in Massachusetts against a party
domiciled in Mexico City. These rulings indicate enforceability of awards
makes binding arbitration a more predictable way of resolving disputes
than adjudication by courts of either country.
Moreover, binding arbitration has advantages over a mini-trial, me-
diation, or conciliation. In the case of mini-trials, which are becoming
more popular in Texas, the parties would face the same concerns as in
entering the foreign court. If the Mexican party is asked to submit to
a mini-trial by agreement in the contract, he or she would find the entire
procedure not only unfamiliar but non-binding. Thus, following such a
proceeding, the Mexican party would always face the unpleasant prospect
of trial in a U.S. court. If the same procedure were available in Mexico,
it would not be appealing to the U.S. businessperson for the identical
reasons.
Further, with respect to mediation and conciliation, once the parties
have elected to either seek arbitration or go to court, they may be beyond
the stage where non-binding measures can effectively resolve the problem.
Given the authority to mediate and conciliate, the arbitrator can play a
vital role because the parties know that the arbitrator has the authority
to render a definitive decision which will finally resolve their dispute if
mediation/conciliation fails.
B. Impartiality of the Decision Maker
One of the principal advantages of arbitration as a preferred method
for settling international business disputes is that it offers a neutral tribunal
which neither party may be able to find in the country of the other.
The parties choose the judge and the jury, rather than being assigned
finders of fact and law as in court proceedings. As will be discussed is
more detail, a properly drafted arbitration clause will also allow the
parties to designate the law to be applied, the location of the proceedings,
and the language to be used. This ability to obtain impartiality fulfills
the business manager's need for a potential dispute to be decided fairly.
C. Confidentiality
A peculiarity of both arbitration proceedings and awards is that they
are normally carried out privately. Indeed, the rules of several arbitration
institutions require that proceedings be confidential unless the parties to
the dispute direct otherwise. On the other hand, both court proceedings
33. Docket No. 757/78 of the Fifth Chamber of the Superior Tribunal of Justice in the Federal
District, DOING Bus. IN MExico, Mar. 12, 1979, § 18.06-18.07.
34. Docket No. 170/77, decision rendered by the Fifth Chamber of the Higher Court of Appeals
of the Federal District, DOING Bus. IN MExico, Aug.1, 1977, § 18.06-18.07.
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and judgments are public. Because commercial relationships often involve
confidential information such as trade secrets, neither party desires such
confidential matters be available to third parties. In addition, because
many international commercial relationships are of a long standing nature,
it would hinder the ongoing relationship to have "dirty linen" aired in
public.
D. Technical Expertise
Many commercial relationships involve products, services or technology
that are technologically complex. For a tribunal to resolve such a dispute,
the arbitrator or judge must have a considerable amount of technical
knowledge concerning the subject matter in dispute. The parties, by
choosing arbitrators who are technically knowledgeable, are more likely
to have a 'judgc' with the specialized competence needed to properly
evaluate technical claims.
E. Expense and Expeditious Resolution
Arbitration can be a less expensive means of resolving a dispute than
a court proceeding. If either of the parties to a dispute is a small company
or the amount in controversy is small, litigation may be too expensive
and, therefore, not practical for resolving disputes. If there is a sole
arbitrator available who is known to the parties and has technical knowl-
edge in the area, the dispute could be resolved inexpensively so that the
parties can go on about their business without any significant rancor
existing between them. Further, arbitration clauses may require only
written proofs and arguments, thus avoiding the expense of presenting
live witnesses. Arbitration can also be a faster and more expeditious
means of resolving a dispute. Again, in contrast to litigation, arbitration
allows the parties the flexibility to obtain an impartial arbitrator and
quickly submit a dispute which cannot be resolved by negotiation. With
a properly worded arbitration clause, the parties can establish a time
frame within which a dispute must be resolved.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AND AD HOC ARBITRATION
Ad hoc and institutional arbitration are the two principal mechanisms
for binding arbitration of commercial disputes between Mexican and U.S.
parties. Ad hoc arbitration in its purest sense is an agreement between
the parties with respect to all aspects of the arbitration. This includes
the law which will be applied, the rules under which the arbitration will
be carried out, the method for the selection of the arbitrator, the place
where the arbitration will be held, the language(s) to be used, and most
importantly, the scope and issues to be resolved by means of arbitration.
Ad hoc arbitration may, however, rely upon the rules of one of the
arbitration institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce
Court of Arbitration (ICC), the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Association (IACAC), or the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
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Parties often choose to employ ad hoc arbitration because they believe
they will be able to save money, accelerate the procedure, and structure
their proceedings in a manner that suits their own needs. In addition,
ad hoc arbitration is chosen over institutional arbitration because of a
party's belief that there exists an inherent bias in favor of one of the
parties in a particular institution. I have found that ad hoc arbitration
is preferable to institutionalized arbitration in most cases. Usually, these
relationships will be long-term and quite personal. Ad hoc arbitration
offers an opportunity for crafting an arbitration agreement allowing for
procedures that meet the wishes and needs of the parties in their particular
commercial relationships.
Under institutional arbitration, on the other hand, the parties specify
in the agreement that one of the above institutions, or some other
institution, will administer the proceedings from the time of demand
through the award. The institution chosen may or may not administer
the arbitration according to its own rules. It is worth noting that the
ICC will not administer an arbitration except under its own rules. Using
an arbitration institution has several advantages including pre-established
rules, administrative assistance, appointment of arbitrators, physical fa-
cilities in which to hold the arbitration, support services of secretaries
and translators, assistance with technical advice, and review of the final
award to ensure that it meets the basic requirements for enforcement.
There are, however, important disadvantages to institutionalized arbitra-
tion which include inflated prices and delays. In addition to legal fees
incurred under ad hoc or institutional arbitration, the institution will
charge administrative fees for the use of its services and facilities, and
for the arbitrator's services. The ICC is the most active of arbitral services
and also receives most of the criticism regarding fees. Under the ICC
rules, charges and fees are calculated as a percentage of the claim. Thus,
the higher the amount of the claim, the higher the arbitration cost
regardless of the nature of the matter under dispute. Other criticisms
include the claim that the bureaucracies inherent with institutional ar-
bitration often promote delays and add costs to the parties.
If the parties decide in favor of institutional arbitration, they must
agree on a specific institution to arbitrate their disputes. The two insti-
tutions most commonly chosen for the resolution of disputes between
Mexican and U.S. parties are the ICC and the AAA. The ICC and
IACAC are oftentimes preferred by Mexican businesspersons over the
AAA because they have more experience and are not perceived to be so
directly linked to the United States. However, the AAA has formulated
International Rules of Arbitration modeled after the UNCITRAL rules
which are seen as even-handed among Latin lawyers. In addition, AAA
proceedings are administered less expensively than the ICC because it
has a lower fee structure.
V. DRAFTING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Drafting a solid arbitration agreement is the best method of ensuring
a successful arbitration outcome. A well drafted agreement should be in
Symposium 19971
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accordance with the needs of the particular situation and be expressed
clearly and unambiguously. There must be close consultation between the
Mexican businessperson, the U.S. counterpart, and their legal counsel to
achieve these drafting objectives.
A. Scope of Arbitration
Drafting a list of all the possible issues that could be subject to a
dispute in the course of a business relationship is unrealistic. Therefore,
the arbitration clause should be as broad as possible. For example:
Any dispute or controversy or claim arising out of or in connection
with or relating to this contract, or breach or termination or invalidity
thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the
rules of (preferred rules) which are then in force.
Attaining clarity requires considerable attention since both Spanish and
English will be used in writing the agreement. For example, words such
as "claims", "differences", or "disputes" must be used carefully to
ensure that there is a common understanding between the parties as to
what is intended. The phrasing of the scope clause set out above is an
amalgam of work done by lawyers from around the world in the course
of drafting the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. However, while satisfactory
for many situations, the terms may need further clarification to fit
individual cases.
Other phrases requiring examination of limitations in the context in
which they are used are 'in connection with,' 'in relation to,' 'in respect
of,' 'with regard to,' 'under,' and 'arising out of.' English courts have
given the widest meaning to the phrase 'arising out of,' and this wording
will usually embrace all disputes capable of being submitted to arbitration
except when the issue is whether or not the contract had any existence
ab initio. Although it is important to draft the clause as broadly as
possible, some matters are not subject to private arbitration. An arbitration
clause cannot cover matters which are not capable of being submitted
to arbitration because of public policy considerations. For example, ar-
bitration of a dispute about the validity or infringement of a patent
cannot be submitted to arbitration in either the United States or Mexico.
The judicial or administrative authorities of each nation have been vested
with the exclusive jurisdiction for resolving such disputes.
B. Choice of Arbitrator
The most important step in any arbitration is the selection of the
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is important, therefore, that the
agreement to arbitrate be clear in regard to the method for selecting the
arbitrator(s). If the parties have adopted the rules of one of the insti-
tutions, particularly the UNCITRAL rules, the ICC rules, or the AAA
rules, then the method for choosing the panel is fixed. If the parties
have agreed to an ad hoc form of arbitration, the arbitration clause
should expressly state how the arbitrator(s) will be selected. The most
important element of the selection criteria is whether the arbitrator must
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have a special skill. If a technical, legal, or economic expertise is required,
it should be specified in the arbitration agreement.
Normally, tribunals in international arbitrations consist of a panel in
which each party to the agreement appoints one member and the two
chosen then name the third who acts as the presiding arbitrator. The
panel need not be selected in this way, but whatever method is utilized,
it should be clearly written in the arbitration agreement. If the arbitration
is to be conducted by a sole arbitrator, the method for choosing the
arbitrator should be articulated including a clause stating what should
happen if the parties cannot agree.
While a panel of arbitrators is the usual standard for international
commercial arbitrations, a sole arbitrator is often preferable. This is
especially true where the parties have a long-standing relationship and
the issues to be resolved do not involve a large amount of money. With
a sole arbitrator, overall costs are substantially less and the dispute will
be resolved much more quickly than by a panel of arbitrators.
C. Choice of Law
Parties to a commercial transaction between Mexico and the United
States may stipulate that the law of one or the other country governs
the transaction. Indeed, if the transaction involves technology transfer
contracts, the law of Mexico must be chosen in order to obtain approval
for registration of the license agreement. In general, however, neither
party will find the law of the other totally acceptable, and the parties
should focus upon general international standards and the customs and
usage of trade.
Insofar as it will not offend the laws of either country to the extent
of preventing the arbitral award from being enforced, my preference is
that the parties should attempt to avoid having a particular body of
national law apply to the transaction. Rather, parties should specifically
authorize the arbitrator to decide future disputes in accordance with
general principles of international law relating to international trade or
investment or customary rules of equity and commerce. Such a provision
avoids the difficulties of applying laws of either nation. It also insulates
the parties from unilateral changes in the law of either Mexico or the
United States. Authorizing the arbitrator to decide the dispute by acting
as an amiable compositor, or on the basis of ex aequo et bono, is
growing in popularity. Under this type of provision the arbitrator is
permitted to decide the dispute on the basis of justice and fairness rather
than on the basis of specific rules of law. While this type of "choice
of law" has been criticized and not permitted in countries such as England,
it would probably not encounter difficulty in the United States or in
Mexico.
D. Choice of Location
A well drafted arbitration clause must provide specifically for the
location of the arbitration, naming both the city and the country. In
Symposium 19971
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addition, the country selected should be stable, and have a judiciary
which does not significantly interfere with arbitration.
E. Choice of Language
The arbitration clause or agreement should specify the language or
languages to be used in the arbitration proceeding. The parties may
designate one language as official and allow the option of having a
simultaneous translation to the other language. The technology for si-
multaneous translation is well advanced and can be employed in all but
the most complicated circumstances. The use of simultaneous translation
would make arbitration of commercial disputes between Mexican and
U.S. businesspersons even more attractive than other methods of dispute
resolution.
F. Choice of Rules
Institutional rules must be either specifically referred to in an arbitration
agreement. Similarly, the drafting of ad hoc rules must include at least
these basic provisions: (1) the procedure to initiate arbitral proceedings;
(2) the method for giving notice; (3) the means for dealing with the
refusal of one party to proceed after the other party has properly invoked
the arbitration procedure; and, (4) a reference to the scope and limitation
of discoverable documents. Moreover, the hearing procedures, form of
the award, and enfocement procedures must be spoken to.
VI. INTERPLAY OF MEXICO'S CIVIL AND PENAL LAW
Unlike U.S. law, Mexican law permits parties to a civil dispute to
invoke criminal sanctions and use these sanctions as leverage for nego-
tiating a resolution of the civil dispute. Avoiding this predicament is
reason enough to consider arbitration as an alternative to litigation in
international transactions. Articles 386 and 387 of the "C6digo Penal
para el Distrito Federal" [Federal District Penal Code] are the ones most
likely to be invoked in order to bring a civil dispute to conclusion."
These two provisions describe criminal fraud and what is called simulated
fraud. They provide as follows:
ART. 386: A crime of fraud is committed by one who illicitly misleads
a person or gains an advantage by inducing another in reliance upon
it, and by doing so attains unlawful gains. The crime of fraud is
punishable as follows:
I. With imprisonment of three days to six months and a fine of three
to ten times the minimum daily salary (of the Federal District), when
the value defrauded does not exceed the latter amount.
II. With imprisonment of six months to three years and a fine of
35. D.O., 22 de julio de 1993.
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ten to one hundred times the minimum daily salary, if the value
defrauded exceeded ten but not five hundred times the minimum daily
salary (of the Federal District).
II1. With imprisonment of three to twelve years and fines up to one
hundred twenty times the minimum daily salary (of the Federal District),
where the defrauded value exceeded five hundred times the salary.
ART. 387: The same penalties indicated in the previous Article shall
be imposed upon:
X. One who simulates a contract, a judicial act or writing, in order
to harm another or to obtain wrongful benefit.
A judgment against a judicial depository shall be presumed simulated
when, by virtue of said judgment, action, judicial act or writing, the
result is sequestration of something previously garnished or deposited,
whomever the person may be against whom the action or lawsuit is
filed.
My first experience with how criminal law provisions are invoked came
as a result of a matter I handled in the United States. It involved the
sale on open account of many hundreds of thousands of dollars of
pantyhose. The seller was a Mexican manufacturer and the purchaser
was a U.S. distributor. The Mexican manufacturer had not insisted upon
payment in advance or upon delivery, nor required a letter of credit to
ensure payment of the product delivered to the U.S. distributor. Over
a period of months, a large quantity of the pantyhose was delivered to
the U.S. distributor without payment rendered. The Mexican manufacturer
attempted to collect his money through a series of meetings in the United
States and Mexico with representatives of the distributor. I was consulted
after the Mexican manufacturer begin to realize that its informal efforts
to obtain payment would not succeed. After reviewing the facts and
circumstances of the case, I urged my clients to bring suit in the ap-
propriate U.S. jurisdiction in order to collect the money. Over a period
of months and many meetings, my Mexican client continued to be reluctant
to bring a civil suit. Finally, in a meeting in which I had become quite
exasperated, I asked them how did they expect to collect this money
unless they brought suit. Their response was that they knew that under
"the law", without referring to which law they had in mind, a criminal
charge for fraud could be brought which can be used as leverage to
force the distributor to pay.
My client explained to me that the leverage provided by such a criminal
charge is not the charge itself, but the judicial order of detention. Because
bail is completely within the discretion of a court in Mexico, the charging
party litigates to prevent bail being granted. The charged party often
stays in jail until the matter is resolved. This was my first encounter
with how Mexicans view the relationship between penal law and civil
law. I have since come to realize that filing a criminal charge in the
context of a civil dispute is the weapon of choice utilized in a civil
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dispute by the party who wants rapid and decisive results. I explained
to my Mexican clients that U.S. law would not permit such a use of
criminal statutes to resolve a civil dispute. They were dumbfounded.
The experience I just recounted was very early in my private practice.
It was not until some time later that I began to appreciate the full
dimensions of the relationship between the Mexican penal and civil law.
My enlightenment in this regard came with respect to some bad checks
that were issued by a Mexican businessperson to one of my U.S. clients.
I consulted with a Mexican penal attorney who outlined the steps that
should be taken to bring the bad check-writer to his senses. First, the
U.S. client made a formal charge. That charge was presented to the
Ministerio Publico, the investigative arm of the prosecutor's office. After
several meetings with the representative of the Ministerio Publico, the
charges were presented by him to a district judge in Mexico who issued
an order of detention. Upon the Mexican party learning of the order of
detention, the checks were paid in cash. This experience was the most
satisfying among several others because the system worked in favor of
my client.
More recent experiences with the relationship of the penal and civil
systems have not been as gratifying. The one that stands out in my mind
with greatest clarity involved my U.S. client who had inherited valuable
Mexican properties and businesses and a Mexican individual who had
worked in the businesses for many years and had gained the confidence
of the now deceased founder. The Mexican party, with the assistance of
excellent corporate and penal counsel in Mexico, had succeeded in es-
tablishing off-shore companies to which the shares of the Mexican com-
panies that owned the businesses were transferred. By this maneuver, the
Mexican citizen who had no actual ownership interest in the Mexican
corporations but did own one-third of the off-shore corporations, now
effectively owned one-third of the Mexican companies.
After the death of the founder, my client discovered this corporate
structure and consulted with Mexican counsel who advised that the shares
of the Mexican corporations could be returned to the ownership of the
shareholders of the Mexican corporations by majority vote of the share-
holders of the off-shore corporation. The proper method for carrying
this out was formal notice in accordance with Mexican law given in
newspapers. The argument of Mexican counsel was that the notices given
were sufficient and that the Mexicans who owned an interest in the off-
shore companies need not be told directly that the shareholder meeting
was scheduled. My client took this advice from his Mexican attorney
and no notice was given to the Mexican organizer. The meeting was held
at which the off-shore corporations were stripped of any ownership in
the Mexican corporations. The Mexican shareowner did not appear at
the meeting. Upon learning that the value of the shares of the off-shore
companies had been reduced to zero, the initial organized commenced
criminal and civil proceedings against my client. At this point, I was
consulted and brought into the matter. The civil and criminal claims of
the Mexican party were essentially that the founder had given a general
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power of attorney permitting the establishment of the off-shore corpo-
rations and the transfer of shares of the Mexican corporations into those
corporations. He further contended that my client had signed an ack-
nowledgment of the existence of the power of attorney and had essentially
approved of what the founder had done. Based upon the above facts,
the criminal charge was fraude por simulation, or simulation of legitimate
acts for the purpose of carrying out a fraudulent objective.
This 'so called' acknowledgment by my client was, in our view, a
forgery. Notwithstanding our proofs by experts that the alleged acknow-
ledgment was a forgery, an order of detention was issued against my
client and he was arrested. During the seven months my client spent in
jail, negotiations and civil court proceedings went on non-stop. The matter
was concluded when an agreement was reached in which my client ceded
an interest in one of the key properties in question. Based upon the
agreement to transfer one of the properties to him, the Mexican party
went before the penal judge and simply changed his testimony about the
alleged acknowledgment by my client. His testimony was essentially that
he could have been mistaken with respect to the acknowledgment actually
having been signed by my client. The penal judge then issued an order
of release. After tying up loose ends produced by civil proceedings in
various states in the Republic of Mexico, the matter was resolved.
Threat of a criminal complaint or a promise to abstain from, discon-
tinue, or delay the prosecution of another for an offense is a crime itself
in Texas.16 Formerly called compounding, the offense is now called
obstruction or retaliation. The Texas Supreme Court addressed this issue
in Lewkowicz v. El Paso Apparel Corporation.3 In this case, one party
to a civil dispute alleged fraud and had the other party thrown into a
Mexican jail. Negotiations continued for approximately five months before
the jailed party consented to signing an "agreement" favorable to the
charging party. Once the agreement was signed, the charging party told
the judge there had been a "misunderstanding." The jailed party was
subsequently released. When the charging party attempted to enforce the
"agreement" in the United States, the Texas Supreme Court declared it
void because it was derived through "compounding." According to the
Texas Supreme Court, "[a] contract made in consideration of com-
pounding a criminal offense is void because it is made in contravention
of the Penal Code and public policy." 3 Even though the agreement was
validly derived under Mexican law, the Texas Supreme Court refused to
enforce it as against the public policy of the state.
According to Corbin on Contracts,39 the compounding of a felony is
itself a common law crime, and any bargain involving such an offense
is necessarily illegal. Corbin identifies such "bargains" as arising in several
36. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.06 (West 1994).
37. 625 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1981).
38. Id. at 305.
39. 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1421, at 354 (1st ed. 1962).
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forms including: (1) promises not to prosecute or not to give evidence
to the prosecuting officers; (2) promises to conceal evidence; and, (3)
promises to cause the dismissal of a prosecution already begun. 40 Citing
Corbin, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
stated that because bargains involving the forbearance of prosecution are
contrary to public policy, such promises are nudum pactum concerning
bargains for compounding crime or stiflinga prosecution."
VII. CONCLUSION
In my experience, commercial disputes between Mexican citizens and
U.S. citizens will not be resolved satisfactorily in the civil justice systems
of either country. The two systems are confusing and daunting to the
parties of a transaction who are not accustomed to using them. IndeedSis my view that most Mexicans only resort to the courts when all
possible opportunities for negotiating a resolution over dispute have been
exhausted. After all, the most common saying in Mexico regarding lit-
igation is, "A bad settlement is better than a good lawsuit." On the
other hand, the U.S. perception of Mexican litigation is a system that
is unpredictable, exceedingly slow, and very expensive when resolving
commercial disputes.
When involved in a court proceeding in Mexico, the cost in terms of
time, money and emotional distress will not stand up in the face of most
cost-benefit analyses. It is worth noting that arbitration has been used
successfully in Mexico for years as an effective method for the resolution
of commercial disputes. In addition, I think you will find an increasing
willingness on the part of U.S. parties to accept arbitration as a means
of dispute resolution. In sum, my experiences with litigating in Mexico
have made me an advocate of arbitration as a means of resolving com-
mercial disputes in Mexico.
40. Id. at 356.
41. See United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d 1088, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (this case involved a
prison official's promise not to prosecute rebellious inmates).
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